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Public education is usually seen as having at least two desirable effects: fos-
tering economic growth and reducing income inequality. This paper revisits both
relations in a single model of occupational choice with an endogenous supply of
teachers. First, we show that the impact of public education expenditures on eco-
nomic growth depends both on the level of these expenditures and the shape of the
human capital distribution. Second, our model shows that the relationship between
public education spending and income inequality can be U-shaped. We provide
empirical evidence for this U-shaped relationship. Finally, we calibrate our model
for 8 OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
Public education is one of the biggest items of public spending across the world. Gov-
ernments in Northern America and Western Europe spent an average of 5.2% of GDP on
all levels of education in 2009, while in other regions of the world, this rate ranged be-
tween 3.6% and 5.0% of GDP (UNESCO (2011)). The public sector is a major provider
of education at all levels. In primary and secondary education, the enrollment rate of
students in public schools in 2013 exceeded 80% in OECD countries on average and (92%
in the U.S.). In tertiary education, on average, 70% of the students (72% in the U.S.)
were enrolled in public institutions in 2013 (OECD 2015).
Robust evidence shows that investment in education, an important input of the accu-
mulation of human capital, has positive effects on individual earnings. Following Mincer
(1974), a large body of literature has empirically investigated the return to education
and found a positive association between years of schooling and earnings.1 Empirical
evidence also tend to demonstrate that education attainment is positively correlated with
aggregate income growth.2 Public education can be used as an instrument to sustain
economic growth and correct for market inefficiencies arising from human capital exter-
nalities (Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Romer (1990)) or credit market
imperfections (Galor and Zeira (1993)).3 In addition, public education is also perceived
as reducing income inequality. By providing the same level of schooling to everyone re-
gardless of parental income, public education could be used as a policy tool to reduce
income inequality. Such a negative relationship between investment in public education
and income inequality is explored theoretically by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Saint-
Paul and Verdier (1993), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) and Zhang (1996).4 Braun (1988),
Goodspeed (2000), Sylwester (2002) and Keller (2010) provide empirical evidence in favor
of a negative relationship between public education expenditures and income inequality.
In contrast to the existing literature, we document a U-shaped relationship between public
education spending and income inequality. This suggests that a higher level of public
1See for instance Card (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a discussion of empirical evidence.
2Evidence of the role of human capital and schooling on economic growth can be found among others
in Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Cohen and Soto
(2007).
3Blankenau, Simpson, and Tomljanovich (2007) find empirical evidence for a positive relationship
between public education expenditures and economic growth.
4An exception is Glomm and Ravikumar (2003) who show that the effect of higher public education
expenditures on income inequality may be positive in the short run. They nevertheless obtain a positive
association in the long run.
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education spending is not necessarily associated with lower income inequality (Table 1).
This result is obtained by regressing income inequality on education spending as a share
of GDP and its squared value in a cross-section of countries. The convex relationship
between public education spending and inequality is robust to controls and holds for
different measures of inequality.5 In Figure 1 and regressions (i) to (vi) in Table 2, we
report the same U-shaped relationship for contiguous US States (all US States excluding
Alaska and Hawaii and including District of Columbia).6
In this context, the contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we propose an overlapping
generations model of endogenous growth through human capital accumulation in which
the quality of education is determined endogenously. A recent body of literature has
highlighted the importance of education quality in explaining differences in income both
between individuals and between countries. When the quality of education differs from
one country to the other, school attainment (or years of schooling) is not an appropriate
measure of relative human capital. Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and Woess-
mann (2012) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2015) further show that differences in the
quality of education can also explain variation in economic growth rates across countries.
This suggests that factors affecting the quality of education (and not only years of school-
ing) should be taken into consideration when analyzing the role of education on economic
growth.7 In this paper, we propose to model the supply side of education in a model of
occupational choice focusing on public education.8 In particular, agents are heterogeneous
in terms of their human capital and can become workers, managers or teachers. When
young, agents go to school and build their human capital. Teachers’ relative wage in the
economy endogenously determines the quality of education (teachers’ human capital) and
affects the growth rate of the economy.9 We derive an explicit relationship between the
growth rate of the economy and teacher quality, which has potential implications for em-
5See Appendix A.1 for a description of the control variables and Appendix A.3 for the various measures
of inequality.
6Data is described in Appendix A.2.
7In a recent paper, Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) show that a large share of TFP differences across
countries can be explained by differences in human capital when agents can choose both the number of
years of schooling but also the amount of human capital acquired per year of schooling.
8Our model shares some features with the recent growth literature with heterogeneous agents and
occupational choice developed by Lucas (2009), Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2012), Alvarez, Buera, and
Lucas (2013), Lucas and Moll (2014), Perla and Tonetti (2014) and Luttmer (2014). They develop
growth mechanisms based on knowledge diffusion but never consider educators as a distinct occupation
group.
9See Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) for a literature review of the positive impact of higher teacher’s
quality on students’ achievement and earnings.
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Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(10/10 ratio)
log(pub.educ.) 3.953** 4.061** 4.369*** 6.506***
(1.742) (1.667) (1.497) (1.763)
log(pub.educ.)2 0.621** 0.623** 0.676*** 0.958***
(0.258) (0.249) (0.220) (0.248)
log(gdp) 1.427*** 1.559*** 2.142***
(0.322) (0.341) (0.484)
















Constant 8.893*** 3.948 4.003 7.205*
(2.919) (3.187) (2.960) (3.713)
Observations 139 139 139 119
R2 0.05 0.16 0.19 0.33





ratio is defined as the ratio of income of the top 10% of the income distribution to the bottom 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Variables are
described in Appendix A.1 and are averaged over the period 1991-2010.
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pirical research. Current empirical work on the link between public education (measured
by public education expenditures as a share of GDP) and economic growth finds mixed
results.10 Our model suggests that such empirical work should control for the quality
of the educational sector. In particular, we show that economies with a higher level of
inequality (measured by the variance of the human capital distribution) can generally
attract relatively better teachers for a given level of public education spending. This
implies that one should control for higher-order moments of human capital distribution
when investigating the relationship between public education expenditures and the rate
of economic growth.
Our second contribution relates to the role of public education in mitigating income
inequality. The increase in income inequality since the late 1970s has recently attracted a
lot of attention both in academic and policy circles.11 The role of several public policies
in shaping the evolution of income inequality has been investigated in the literature.12 In
this paper, we theoretically show that investment in public education does not necessarily
decrease income inequality. An increase in the relative wage of teachers, financed by
higher public education expenditures, augments teacher quality and increases the speed
of human capital accumulation and growth, but can also lead to higher levels of inequality
in the long run.13 Figure 2 and regressions (vii) to (xii) in Table 2 show that the same
U-shaped relationship holds between inequality and education quality (as measured by
teacher wage) across US states. Our model identifies several forces which can potentially
lead to such a result. Introducing an endogenous supply of teachers together with the non-
degenerate distribution of individual human capital and the complementarity of workers
and manager skills allows for a non-monotone effect of public education spending on
income inequality.
The effect of a change in public education expenditures affects the shape of human capital
distribution (through altered education quality) as well as occupational choice. Keeping
the distribution of human capital and the mass of agents in each occupation fixed, an
increase in education expenditures (financed by an increase in taxation) results in a lower
10See for instance Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Blankenau, Simpson, and
Tomljanovich (2007).
11See for instance Katz et al. (1999) for a discussion of recent changes in wage dispersion and Piketty and
Saez (2003) and Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2013) for the evolution of top income inequality.
12See for instance Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) and Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) for a
discussion of the role of income taxation and David, Manning, and Smith (2016) and Card and DiNardo
(2002) for minimum wage.
13Card and Krueger (1992) use teacher wages to measure education quality and find a positive corre-
lation between education quality and return to education.
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demand for workers which leads to a downward pressure on wages and increased inequality.
On the other hand, profits are also negatively affected by an increase in tax which tends
to decrease inequality. In addition, changes in relative wages lead agents to make different
occupational choices. The mass of workers and managers decreases which affects relative
wages. A lower supply of workers leads to higher wages while fewer managers decreases
the demand for workers, and hence puts downward pressure on wages. Eventually, the
reallocation of agents to teaching modifies the shape of human capital distribution. The
overall effect of an increase in education expenditures on income inequality depends on
which effects dominate. We find a U-shaped relationship between education expenditures
and income inequality for some parameter sets. This implies that for low level of public
education, better education quality benefits the poor relatively more while the reverse
happens at high initial levels of public education expenditures. The policy implication
is the following: if a country is on the decreasing part of the U-shaped relationship, it
can increase public spending to foster growth and reduce income inequality. In this case,
growth and the reduction in income inequality go hand in hand. If a country is on the
increasing part of the U-shaped relationship, there is a tradeoff between growth and the
reduction in inequality. Calibrating our model for 8 OECD countries, we find that some
countries (among which the US) could increase growth and decrease income inequality by
increasing public education spending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static model of
occupational choice between three occupations (worker, teacher and manager). Section 3
embeds this occupational choice in a dynamic model in which growth is driven by human
capital accumulation. Section 4 calibrates the model on data from 8 OECD countries.
We show that some countries (including the U.S.) could increase growth and lower income


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Public education expenditures and inequality (US states)
2 A static model of occupational choice
For expositional purposes, we start with a static (one-period) model of occupational
choice. We embed this static model in an overlapping generations structure in Section 3.
Agents can choose between three different jobs: worker, teacher and manager. There is a
measure one of agents in the economy and they are heterogeneous in their level of human
capital (h) with cdf F : R+ → [0, 1]. There is a single consumption good in the economy.
2.1 The Agent problem
The choice of occupation by agents is driven by the return to the three potential jobs
which is itself a function of human capital. We assume that agents cannot perform more
than one job. If an agent decides to become a worker, she inelastically supplies one unit
of labor and receives a wage w which is determined endogenously. A teacher receives a
wage wT . Teachers do not directly participate in production. Firms produce output by
combining one manager with a set of workers. A firm’s production is determined by the
8
Figure 2: Public education expenditures and teacher wages (US states)
manager’s span of control as in Lucas (1978). The production function of a manager with
a level of human capital h is given by:
y(h) = Ahn(h)α (1)
where A is the productivity parameter common to all managers, α ∈ (0, 1) and n(h) is
the labor demand of a firm employing a manager with human capital h.
The profit function for the firm as a function of the managers level of human capital h is
then given by:
pi(h) = A(1− τ)hn(h)α − wn(h) (2)
where w is the wage paid to workers and τ is a tax on production. This tax is used by
the government to finance public education spending and in particular to pay teachers’
wages.
















The profit of managers is convex in the level of human capital, decreasing in the level of
the tax and limh→0 pi(h) = 0. We assume that the profit of the firm is entirely paid to
managers as wage.14 In the remainder of the paper, a manager’s wage and the profit of
her firm are used interchangeably.
We assume the following utility function:
u(c, h) = c− 1Tγ(h) (5)
where c is consumption, 1T takes the value one if the agent is a teacher and zero otherwise
and γ(h) is a utility cost of working as a teacher.15 We assume that this cost is strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in the level of human capital with limh→0 γ(h) = ∞ and
limh→∞ γ(h) = 0.
Agents consume their wage or profit so that the utility for an agent with human capital
h associated with the three occupations is given by:
uW (h) = w as a worker (6)
uT (h) = wT − γ(h) as a teacher (7)







Agents choose the occupation which gives the highest utility given their level of human
capital.
14This is obtained if we assume that there is free-entry of firms competing for managers. In this case,
any manager with human capital h works for a firm which offers a wage equal to the maximum profit
that a manager with human capital h can generate. All firms consequently make no profit in equilibrium.
15This could, for instance, reflect the formal requirement of a particular degree in order to teach in
public schools.
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2.2 Government budget constraint
We assume that the government has a single role in our economy. It levies a proportional
tax (τ) on the production of managers whose revenues are used to pay teachers’ wages







where T and M respectively stand for the sets of teachers and managers in the economy.


















In order to derive the equilibrium conditions, we first show that the distribution of agents
over occupations for given wages for workers (w) and teachers (wT ) can be summarized
by two cutoffs hW and hM (hW ≤ hM). Agents with human capital respectively below hW
(above hM) choose to be workers (managers) and agents with human capital between hW
and hM choose to be teachers. We then show that the condition w
T > w+ γ(pi−1(w)) has
to hold in any equilibrium. This implies that, in equilibrium, there is a positive mass of
agents working in each occupation and that teachers receive a higher wage than workers.
Proposition 1 Given wages (w > 0 and wT > 0) and a human capital distribution with
support R+, the optimal occupational choice of agents is defined by two cutoffs (hM ≥
hW ). Agents with human capital below hW become workers and agents with human capital
between hW and hM become teachers. Agents with human capital above hM work as
managers.
Proof: The proof starts from the limit behavior of the utility function under the three




uT (h) = −∞ and lim
h→∞
uT (h) = wT (11)
lim
h→0







uW (h) > lim
h→0







uT (h) > lim
h→∞
uW (h) (14)
Since wages are strictly positive, teacher and manager wages are continuously and mono-
tonically increasing in human capital, teacher wage is strictly concave and profits strictly
convex, which proves the existence of two cutoffs. First, there exists a cutoff (hW > 0)
up to which agents find it optimal to become workers. There also exists another cutoff
(hM ≥ hW ) above which agents decide to become managers. This implies that only agents
in the middle of the human capital distribution (between hW and hM) want to become
teachers. To have a strictly positive mass of agents working as teachers, two conditions
are needed: first, the wage of teachers (wT ) must be strictly greater than that of workers
since teachers suffer a positive utility cost and, second, the utility of working as a teacher
with human capital hW (i.e. w) must be strictly greater than the profit of a manager
with the same level of human capital i.e., we need the teacher utility function to intersect
w before the profit function (both teacher utility and profit intersect the worker wage
function only once):16
h∗ = {h : w = wT − γ(h∗)} < h∗∗ = {h : w = pi(h∗∗)} (15)
wT > w + γ(pi−1(w)) (16)
If Equation (16) is satisfied, h∗ = hW > hM and there is a positive mass of teachers in the
economy. Otherwise, hW = hM and there are workers and managers only in the economy.

Static Equilibrium Definition: Given a distribution of human capital F : R+ → [0, 1]
and a tax rate (τ), a static equilibrium is a collection of wages (w, wT , pi(h)), cutoffs
(hW , hM), demand for workers (n(h)), and final good production (y(h)) such that:
1. Given wages, firms maximize profit.
2. Given wages, agents maximize utility by following a cutoff strategy in which agents
16Since teacher utility and profits are monotonically increasing functions of human capital, w > 0,
lim
h→0
uT (h) = −∞ and lim
h→0
uM (h) = 0.
12
with human capital in [0, hW ) become workers, agents with human capital in [hW , hM)
are teachers and agents with human capital above hM work as managers.
3. Labor market clears:
∫∞
hM




4. Government budget is balanced:
∫ hM
hW




Proposition 1 shows that agents with low (high) levels of human capital choose to become
workers (managers). Teachers, provided that wT > w + γ(pi−1(w)), are to be found
in the middle of the human capital distribution. We now prove that, in equilibrium,
wT > w + γ(pi−1(w)) has to hold.
Proposition 2 Given a human capital distribution with support R+ and a tax rate τ > 0,
there is a positive mass of agents working in each occupation in equilibrium i.e. wT >
w + γ(pi−1(w)) and hW < hM .
Proof: First, we can show that the wage of workers is positive in equilibrium. If it was
not positive, the managers’ demand for labor would be infinite (see Equation (3)) and,
hence, the labor market condition could not be satisfied. Having proved that w > 0 in
any equilibrium, we know from Proposition 1 that a strictly positive mass of agents finds
it optimal to become workers and managers. To prove that there must also be a positive
mass of teachers in equilibrium, we use the government budget balance condition:∫ hM
hW
wT dF (h) =
∫ ∞
hM
τy(h) dF (h) (17)
Since there is a positive mass of workers and managers, production is positive and hence











This would contradict the assumption that no agents find it optimal to become a teacher
and, hence, there must be a positive mass of teachers in the economy in equilibrium. 
To determine the equilibrium conditions of the static model, we combine the indiffer-
ence conditions and the market clearing condition. Agents with human capital hW are
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indifferent between being a teacher and a worker and agents with human capital hM are
indifferent between being a teacher and a manager. In addition, wages (w and wT ) and
human capital cutoffs have to satisfy the balanced government budget and the labor mar-
ket clearing condition. The equilibrium in this static model can be summarized by the
following system of four equations and four unknowns:
w = wT − γ(hW ) (19)





















F (hM)− F (hW ) (21)










1−α dF (h) (22)
where Equations (19) and (20) comes from agents’ indifference between occupations at
the cutoffs hW and hM , Equation (21) corresponds to the balanced government budget
and Equation (22) is the labor market clearing condition.
Figure 3 shows an example of equilibrium occupational choice by agents. The dotted lines
represent utility as a function of human capital under the three occupations. Workers get
a wage which is independent of their level of human capital. Teachers receive a wage and
incur a convex utility cost. The profit of managers is increasing and convex in human
capital (see Equation (4)). The solid line represents the equilibrium utility of agents as a
function of human capital i.e., the maximum of the utility across the three occupations.
In equilibrium, agents with human capital below hW become workers, agents with human
capital between hW and hM become teachers agents with human capital above hM are
managers.
2.4 Comparative statics
In this section, we study how the equilibrium changes as we change the tax rate τ . The
objective of this paper is to eventually analyze the effect of public education spending on
education quality, economic growth and income inequality in a dynamic version of the
model presented in this section. In a static one-period model, education plays no role in
14
Figure 3: Occupational choice.
Notes: In this example, we assume γ(x) = 1
x
, α = 1
3
, τ = 0.1, A = 1 and F is a log-normal distribution with mean and
variance equal to one. Dotted lines represent utility under the three different occupations. The solid line represents the
equilibrium utility derived by agents as a function their level of human capital.
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the economy as there is no human capital accumulation. We can nevertheless study how
the quality of education evolves as public spending increases. We measure the quality of




h dF (h) (23)
Figure 4 shows comparative statics for τ . Increasing τ raises the incentive for agents to
become teachers as it increases teacher wage ceteris paribus. On the other hand, it also
decreases the net profit of managers and their labor demand which also makes teaching
relatively more attractive to agents. As a consequence, the mass of teachers increases and
the masses of workers and managers decrease as the tax is raised. This means that some
workers and managers switch to teaching when the tax rate is increased. As teaching
attracts more agents, the quality of education (S) also improves. However, it is apparent
from Figure 4 that there is a trade-off between production and quality of education.
This comes from the fact that improving the quality of education through higher public
education spending diverts agents from the productive sector of the economy. Manager
wage monotonically decreases with the tax rate. Worker wage and teacher wage, however,
are concave in the tax rate (inverted-U shape). The evolution of the worker wage depends
on the relative change in worker supply and demand following an increase in the tax rate.
Increasing the tax rate, increases the share of production going to teachers. On the other
hand, it also increases the mass of teachers in the economy and decreases total production,
which tends to decrease teacher wage. At low tax levels, the first effect dominates while
it is more than offset by the other two effects for high levels of tax rates generating the
concave relationship between tax and teacher wage in Figure 4. Even though teacher
wage is eventually decreasing in the tax rate, it always increases relatively to worker
and manager (mean) wage (Figure 4). This means that more public education spending
increases the relative wage of teachers so as to make it ever more attractive in our model.
Our model implies that relatively higher wages of teachers are associated with higher
levels of education quality.
16
Figure 4: Comparative statics for τ .
Notes: In this Table, we use γ(x) = 1
x
, α = 1
3
and A = 1. F is a log-normal distribution with mean and variance equal to
one.
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3 A dynamic model of occupational choice, growth
and inequality
3.1 The dynamic model
In this section, we embed the static model into an overlapping generations model. We
assume that there is at any time a mass one of young and a mass one of old agents in
the economy. Agents live for two periods and only consume when old with preferences
similar to those described in the one-period model in Section 2.1:
uWt (h) = wt as a worker (24)
uTt (h) = w
T
t − γt(h) as a teacher (25)










Each old agent is assumed to have one child so that there is a measure one of families
composed of one young and one old agent. When young, agents go to school and build






where ht is the level of human capital of the old agent in the family at time t, at is an
idiosyncratic shock to the transmission of human capital to the child with distribution
Gt(a) and St =
∫ hM,t
hW,t
h dFt(h) is the quality of education measured as the human capital
of teachers per student.
An agent’s human capital is thus a function of her parents’ human capital, the quality of
the educational system when she is young and a random shock to her ability to absorb
the knowledge from her parent and teachers. The relative importance of parents and
education in the formation of human capital is captured by β1 and β2. We assume that
β1 + β2 = 1 and β1 ∈ (0, 1). An imperfect transmission of knowledge through the shock
a allows for social mobility across generations.
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Dynamic Equilibrium Definition: Given an initial distribution of human capital F0 :
R+ → [0, 1], a distribution for the shock a (G) and a tax rate (τ), a dynamic equilibrium
is a sequence of wages (wt, w
T
t , pit(h)), cutoffs (hW,t, hM,t), demand for workers (nt(h)),
education quality (St) and final good production (yt(h)) so that, at every period:
1. Given wages, firms maximize profit.
2. Given wages, agents maximize utility by following a cutoff strategy in which agents
with human capital in [0, hW,t) become workers, agents with human capital in [hW,t, hM,t)
are teachers and agents with human capital above hM,t work as managers.























In the remainder of the paper, we make the following assumptions regarding initial con-





log(h0) ∼ N (µ0, σ20) (29)
log(at) ∼ N (µa, σ2a) (30)
where h¯t is the mean human capital level of old agents at time t.
The choice of the functional form of γt(h) enables us to obtain a strictly positive difference
in wage between workers and teachers in the long run. The shock to the transmission
of human capital is assumed to be the same across agents and across time. The dis-
tributional assumptions lead to the existence of a balanced growth path. Given these
assumptions, we can show that the distribution of human capital at any time t has a
log-normal distribution. In particular,
log(ht+1) ∼ N
(










In the long run, the variance of log(ht) converges to
σ2a
1−β21 . If σ
2
a = 0, the distribution of
human capital converges to a degenerate distribution, in which case there is no income
inequality in the long run.
Balanced Growth Path Definition: A balanced growth path is a dynamic equilibrium
in which:
1. hW,t, hM,t, St, Yt =
∫∞
hM,t
yt(h) dFt(h), wt and w
T
t all grow at the same rate g.




3. The masses of workers, teachers and managers are constant.
In a balanced growth path, the growth rate of the economy (g) is given by:






g ≈ µa + (1− β1) [log(St)− µt] (33)
Long-term growth in the economy is increasing in the quality of education (St) relative
to the human capital level in the economy. This has two main consequences. First,
increasing the quality of public education leads to higher growth rates. Second, two
countries with the same level of public education expenditures can have different rates
of growth depending on the shape of the distribution of human capital in the economy.
Figure 5 shows the growth rate of an economy with similar public education expenditures
(as a share of GDP) but different shapes for the human capital distribution. In particular,
we vary the variance of the shock (σa). σa affects the variance and the tail of the human
capital distribution without directly affecting economic growth (Equations (31) and (32)).
This enables us to identify the effect of the shape of the human capital distribution on the
endogenously determined quality of teachers and on economic growth. Economies with
a fatter right tail of the human capital distribution (higher σa) attracts higher quality
teachers for a same level of public education expenditures. This, in turn, results in a
higher level of growth. In other words, the growth rate of the economy is not only a
function of the average level of human capital in the economy but also of higher-order
20
Figure 5: Comparative statics at the steady state: σa.
Notes: In this Table, we use the following parameter values: A=1, α = 0.2, β1 = 0.4, ϕ = 0.01, µa = 3 and τ = 0.05.
moments of the human capital distribution through their effect on the quality of teachers.17
This has implications for empirical studies trying to identify the effect of public education
expenditures on economic growth. In particular, one needs to control for the shape (tail)
of the human capital distribution in the economy when estimating the effect of public
education expenditures on economic growth. This may explain why several empirical
studies fail to find a robust significant effects of public education expenditures on economic
growth.
3.2 Education spending, growth and inequality
In this section, we focus on balanced growth paths and compare them for different values
of the tax rate τ . In this model, the tax rate τ can also be interpreted as public education
spending as a share of GDP. We measure inequality using the 10/10 ratio i.e. the ratio
of (before-tax) incomes of the top 10% of the income distribution to the bottom 10% of
the income distribution.
Figure 6 confirms that the growth rate of the economy is an increasing function of the
17In a different context, Perla and Tonetti (2014) find a similar positive correlation with the thickness
of the tail of the productivity distribution and economic growth.
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share of GDP devoted to public education. Economies with higher tax rates τ attract
more human capital in the education sector which accelerates growth in the economy.
Regarding inequality, our model implies that the relationship between public education
spending as a share of GDP and inequality (as measured by the 10/10 ratio) may be non-
monotone. In particular, this relationship may have a U shape which means that there
exists a tax rate which minimizes inequality.18 This also suggests that there is eventually
a trade-off between economic growth and income inequality in our model and that the
relationship between economic growth and inequality is non-monotone.
The effect of a tax change on inequality (measured by the 10/10 ratio) can be decomposed
into a direct effect of taxes on managers’ profit and a general equilibrium effect which is
the result of the tax change on equilibrium occupational choice, labor demand and supply,
and hence on wages. Given our choice of parameters, there is no teacher in either the
top or bottom 10% of the income distribution (over the relevant range of taxes) and the
10/10 ratio (before tax) can be written as:
10/10 ratiot =






























dFt(h) depends on τ through the effect of taxes on human
capital distribution, occupational choice and wages. In a balanced growth path, Φ(τ)
converges to a constant.
In a balanced growth path, the derivative of the 10/10 ratio with respect to the tax rate
is:
18The parameter values for the numerical example in Figure 6 have been chosen so that there is no
teacher in either the top or bottom 10% of the distribution at any tax rate. This implies that the non-
monotone relationship between public education spending and inequality is not due to a change in the
occupational composition of the top or bottom of the income distribution.
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Figure 6: Comparative statics at the steady state: τ .




= −10A α1−αα 11−α τ(1− τ)
2α−1
1−α
1− α Φ(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct profit effect
+10(1− α(1− τ))A 11−α (α(1− τ)) α1−αΦ′(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
General Equilibrium effect
(37)
The direct profit effect looks at the change in the (before tax) profit of managers keeping
the distribution and wages fixed. The general equilibrium effect takes into account the
change in human capital distribution, occupational choice and wages following a change
in tax rate. The direct effect on profit is always negative as an increase in the tax rate
decreases managers’ profit ceteris paribus. Depending on whether the general equilibrium
effect is positive or negative, the total effect of a change in education spending on inequal-
ity can be positive or negative. The sign of the general equilibrium effect depends on the
effect of a tax change on labor supply (workers) and demand (managers) which, in turn,
depends on the occupational choice of agents. Figure 6 (Panel E) shows that the general
equilibrium effect eventually becomes positive and offsets the direct profit effect so that
inequality starts increasing as the tax is raised. We can further decompose the general
equilibrium effect into two parts: one related to the direct effect of a change in education
spending on wages and the other related to the change in the distribution of occupations






























The general equilibrium effect (gee) can then be decomposed as:
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= 10(1− α(1− τ)) Ψ(τ)
(1− α)α(1− τ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct wage effect
+ 10(1− α(1− τ)) Ψ
′(τ)
α(1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distributional effect
(40)
The direct labor demand effect captures the direct effect of a change in the tax rate
on inequality i.e. the effect of the decreased demand for workers by managers after a
tax increase keeping constant the distribution, the mass of managers and the supply
of workers. This effect always increases inequality as measured by the 10/10 ratio. The
distributional effect measures the role of changing occupational choice as well as of human
capital distribution (since modifying public education spending changes the quality of
education, it also alters the human capital distribution).
The distributional effect can, in turn, be decomposed into two parts: one relates to the
change in labor supply (mass of workers) and the other to both changes at the top of the
human capital distribution and in the mass of managers.

























Panel C of Figure 6 shows that the mass of workers is decreasing in the tax rate. Ev-
erything else kept constant, a decrease in the supply of labor results in an increase in
wages and hence in a decrease in income inequality. The second term, which relates to
the distribution of managers, is increasing (Panel F of Figure 6). This term shows that,
ceteris paribus, a change in the human capital distribution resulting from better school
quality benefits the managers at the top of the distribution.
Overall, the effect of a change in public education spending as a share of GDP on inequality




= Direct profit effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+Direct labor demand effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ Labor supply effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+Manager distribution effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(43)
The sign of the derivative in Equation (43) depends on which effects dominate.
The effect of increasing education spending on inequality is ambiguous and depends on
the parameter values. Section 4 calibrates our model to data from 8 OECD countries in
order to determine whether some countries are in the decreasing part of the inequality -
public education relationship. In such a case, a country would have the opportunity to
increase its growth rate without increasing inequality.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between education spending and alternative measures of
inequality. In particular, we report the ratio of the income of the top and bottom 20%
(20/20 ratio), the Gini coefficient, the share of income held by the richest 20% and 10%.
In all cases, the relation between the tax rate and inequality is U-shaped. This shows
that the non-monotone relationship between education spending and inequality reported
in Figure 6 holds for other measures of inequality as well.
4 Quantitative exercise: 8 OECD countries
In this section, we provide numerical examples of the relationship between public ed-
ucation spending, economic growth and inequality for a sample of 8 OECD countries
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the US. For
each country, we set A = 1 and jointly calibrate the other parameters of the model (α,
β1, ψ, µa and σa) to match 5 moments in the data: inequality, real GDP growth rate,
the fraction of teachers in the economy, the relative wage of teachers to other workers
and intergenerational income mobility. We obtain data on the share of workers in the
education and other sectors as well as corresponding wages from the International Labor
Organization. Data on inequality and public education spending as a share of GDP comes
from the World Bank. For all these variables, we use average values over the period 1991-
2010.19 Real GDP growth over the period 1991-2010 is obtained from the Penn World
19The period is chosen for two reasons: first, 20 years approximately correspond to one period in our
model and, second, data outside this time window is very scarce.
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Figure 7: Alternative measures of inequality.
Notes: In this Table, we use the following parameter values: A=1, α = 0.2, β1 = 0.4, ϕ = 0.01, µa = 3 and σa = 0.85.
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Tables. Corak (2006, 2013) provide a summary of estimates of intergenerational income
elasticity from the empirical literature.
The parameter values used in this section are reported in Table 3. Table 4 compares
the targeted moments in the model and in the data. Using these calibrated parameter
values, we perform the following experiment: we vary the share of GDP spent on public
education and compute the corresponding change in inequality and growth predicted by
our model. The results of this experiment are reported in Figure 8.
Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
α 0.434 0.489 0.528 0.597 0.386 0.489 0.396 0.301
β1 0.417 0.338 0.624 0.604 0.737 0.542 0.767 0.828
ψ 0.178 0.140 0.119 0.165 0.018 0.414 0.130 0.015
µa 1.085 0.982 0.725 0.531 0.365 0.865 0.542 0.331
σa 1.255 1.215 0.820 1.018 1.030 1.019 1.059 1.093
Table 3: Parameter values
Each panel of Figure 8 represents one country. Inequality is measured on the left axis
(10/10 ratio) and annual growth rate on the right axis. The vertical line corresponds to
actual data over the period 1991-2010 in terms of public education spending (as a share
of GDP), inequality and real GDP growth. What our results indicate is that there is
some heterogeneity across countries. Growth in our model is generated by human capital
accumulation through public education. Higher levels of public education spending tend
to increase the quality of public education and hence lead to faster growth in the long run.
The effect of increased public education quality on inequality is ambiguous and depends
on the dominating effects as described in Equation (43). As exemplified in Section 3.2, the
relationship between public education spending (or quality) and inequality is potentially
U-shaped. As a consequence, countries in the decreasing part of this U-shaped relationship
can potentially raise their growth rate and decrease inequalities by increasing their public
education expenditures. On the other hand, countries in the increasing part of the U
face a trade-off between growth and inequality. According to our calibration, Italy, the
UK and the US are in the decreasing part of the U-shaped relationship between public
education spending and inequality while Australia, Canada, Germany, France and Japan
are in the increasing part.
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Figure 8: Calibration results: 10/10 ratio.
Notes: The dashed line represents inequality (left axis) and the solid line growth (right axis) for different levels of public
education spending. The vertical line indicates actual data on public education spending, economic growth and inequality.
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Australia Canada France Germany
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
GDP growth 0.57 0.57 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23
Ratio 10/10 11.1 11.1 9.5 9.5 7.9 7.9 7.3 7.3
Share of teachers 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07
Teacher wage relative to other workers 1.14 1.14 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.04
Income elasticity 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.32
Italy Japan UK US
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
GDP growth 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.51 0.51 0.34 0.34
Ratio 10/10 12.9 12.9 9.2 9.2 13.4 13.4 18.5 18.5
Share of teachers 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.13
Teacher wage relative to other workers 1.01 1.02 1.25 1.25 1.11 1.11 1.02 1.03
Income elasticity 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.47
Table 4: Targeted moments: model vs data
Table 5 reports the effect of an increase by one percentage point of the share of GDP
spent on public education on growth and inequality predicted by our model. Our model
prediction for the change in annual growth rate following a one-percentage-point increase
in public education spending ranges from 0.1% for the US to 0.49% for Japan. On the
other hand, the prediction regarding inequality goes from a decrease by −1.10% of the
10/10 ratio for the US to an increase by 0.92% for Japan. The last column reports the
semi-elasticity between inequality and growth, i.e., the percentage change in inequality
associated with a one-percentage-point increase in growth. This measures the trade-
off between growth and inequality that different countries face in our model. Higher
positive values correspond to stronger trade-off, i.e., a higher cost in terms of increased
inequality for a given increase in growth. Negative values imply that more growth would
be associated with lower inequality. Our calculations indicate that Germany faces the
strongest trade-off and the US the highest “free-lunch” in terms of growth and inequality.
Overall, our quantitative examples suggest that there may be heterogeneity across coun-
tries in terms of the trade-off (or the absence thereof) between growth and inequality
through public education spending. Some countries may be able to raise their economic
growth rate while decreasing inequalities at the same time. In Appendix A.4, we report
similar results using different measures of inequality. We find similar heterogeneity across
countries and systematically find the US and the UK facing no trade-off between growth
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Growth Inequality(10/10 ratio) Semi-elasticity




Australia 2.27% 2.69% 0.42% 11.13 11.17 0.35% 0.83
Canada 1.69% 2.09% 0.40% 9.53 9.57 0.48% 1.19
France 0.97% 1.22% 0.25% 7.88 7.94 0.79% 3.11
Germany 1.06% 1.34% 0.28% 7.33 7.40 0.91% 3.24
Italy 0.60% 0.80% 0.20% 12.87 12.82 −0.41% -2.08
Japan 0.50% 0.99% 0.49% 9.24 9.33 0.92% 1.89
UK 2.07% 2.21% 0.15% 13.38 13.37 −0.05% -0.32
US 1.47% 1.58% 0.10% 18.54 18.34 −1.10% -10.48
Table 5: Predicted change in annual growth and inequality after a one-percentage-point increase in public education
spending
and inequality (except when inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient).
5 Conclusion
Public education is often seen as promoting economic growth through human capital
accumulation and as decreasing inequality by providing the same level of education to
all. This paper revisits the role of public education expenditures on these two important
aspects: growth and inequality. First, we provide a model of occupational choice with
an endogenous supply of teachers. We derive an explicit relationship between relative
teacher quality and the rate of economic growth. We further show that the same level of
public education expenditures does not have the same impact on growth in two economies
differing in their distribution of human capital. In particular, countries with a fatter right
tail of the distribution of human capital can attract teachers of relatively better quality
for the same level of public education expenditures. This suggests that empirical studies
aiming at identifying the role of public education (expenditures) on economic growth
should control for higher orders of the human capital distribution (beyond the mean level
of human capital).
Second, we empirically show that the relationship between public education expenditures
and income inequality is not monotone (U-shaped) in a cross-section of countries and
across US states. We obtain the same result in our model of occupational choice when
substitution between different types of workers is not perfect. In particular, managers and
workers are assumed to be imperfect substitutes in production. Managers’ human capital
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determines their span of control and their demand for workers. Increased public educa-
tion expenditures directly affects income at the top of the distribution (through increased
taxation). In addition, better educational quality affects the shape of the human capital
distribution and occupational choice. This, in turn, modifies the supply and demand for
labor and hence income inequality. Depending on which effect dominates, raising public
education expenditures can have a negative or positive effect on income inequality gener-
ating an overall U-shaped relationship between public education and income inequality. In
particular, we show that increasing public education spending eventually benefits agents
at the top of the human capital distribution relatively more, even though it raises the
production efficiency of all agents. From that perspective, our model has different policy
implications depending on whether the economy belongs to the decreasing or increasing
part of the U-shaped relationship between public education and inequality. Countries in
the decreasing part could reduce inequality and increase growth through increased public
education spending. Countries on the increasing part face a trade-off between growth and
inequality. Increasing public education expenditures would lead to higher growth and
higher income inequality. The optimal level of public education depends in this case on
the preference of the country in terms of growth and inequality.
Finally, we calibrate our model to 8 OECD countries. Our results suggest that some
countries (among which the US and the UK) may be in the decreasing part of the public
education-inequality relationship. This implies that they could decrease income inequality
and increase growth through an increase in public education expenditures. Other countries
face a trade-off between growth and inequality.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data description: cross-country regressions
This appendix describes the data used in Table 1 and in Appendix A.3. We use 6 dif-
ferent measures of inequality. Five of them are obtained from the World Bank: the Gini
coefficient (gini), the ratio of income at the top 10% of the income distribution to the
bottom 10% (10/10 ratio), the ratio of income from the top 20% of the income distribu-
tion to the bottom 20% (20/20 ratio), the share of income going to the top 10% of the
income distribution (Top 10%) and to the top 20% (Top 20%). We also use an alternative
measure of the Gini coefficient from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database
(gini SWIID). Data on public education spending as a share of GDP (pub. educ.) is
obtained from the UNESCO database. Real GDP per capita (gdp), growth rate of real
GDP (growth), public expenditures as a share of GDP (pub. exp.) and openness mea-
sured by the share of imports and exports in GDP (open) come from the World Bank
database. Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP
(priv. cred.) is used as a measure of the financial development of the country and is
obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. We also control for the average
level of education measured by the average total number of years of schooling (school)
from the Barro and Lee database (Barro and Lee (2013)). We use the measure of civil
liberties (civil right) computed by Freedom House. Data are averaged over the period
1991-2010.
A.2 Data description: US states regressions
We obtain US state-level income inequality data from Frank (2014) covering top 10%
and top 1% income shares, Gini coefficients, Theil indexes, the relative mean deviation
(rmeandev) and the Atkinson index with 5% inequality aversion parameter (atkin05) as
well as the share of the population with at least a high school degree (school).20. We also
use data on state-level on public education spending as a share of GDP (pub. educ.), total
state and local public expenditures (pub. exp.)21 and GDP and income growth data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional economic accounts. We collect data on average
teacher wages (teach. wage) at the state level from the National Education Association.
20Data is available at http : //www.shsu.edu/eco mwf/inequality.html.
21Source: usgovernmentspending.com.
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Data are averaged over the period 2004 - 2010. District of Columbia is excluded from the
sample when working with public expenditures.
A.3 Additional regressions: alternative measures of inequality
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: log(20/20 ratio) log(Top10%) log(Top20%) log(gini) log(gini SWIID)
log(pub.educ.) 5.329*** 1.751*** 1.368*** 1.783*** 0.985***
(1.291) (0.473) (0.335) (0.495) (0.329)
log(pub.educ.)2 0.788*** 0.257*** 0.202*** 0.261*** 0.156***
(0.180) (0.0646) (0.0457) (0.0680) (0.0454)
log(gdp) 1.776*** 0.633*** 0.464*** 0.682*** 0.217*
(0.370) (0.139) (0.100) (0.145) (0.117)
log(gdp)2 -0.114*** -0.0419*** -0.0302*** -0.0440*** -0.0132*
(0.0243) (0.00908) (0.00659) (0.00961) (0.00776)
growth -4.592 -1.146 -0.940 -1.876 -0.135
(3.890) (1.519) (1.090) (1.584) (1.381)
growth2 19.27 -10.52 -0.440 8.818 -0.915
(63.43) (21.82) (15.94) (23.63) (19.70)
school -0.0838*** -0.0337*** -0.0250*** -0.0362*** -0.0225***
(0.0259) (0.00826) (0.00599) (0.00877) (0.00680)
pub.exp. -1.425 -0.737 -0.515 -0.880 0.499
(1.393) (0.499) (0.366) (0.549) (0.356)
open -0.0337 -0.0286 -0.00792 -0.00460 -0.0282
(0.166) (0.0547) (0.0397) (0.0586) (0.0403)
civil right -0.127*** -0.0422** -0.0326** -0.0478** -0.0427***
(0.0471) (0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0186) (0.0154)
priv.cred. 0.198 0.104 0.0516 0.0607 0.0389
(0.200) (0.0665) (0.0500) (0.0771) (0.0536)
Constant 5.570** 4.586*** 4.783*** 0.0886 0.114
(2.744) (0.972) (0.712) (1.076) (0.690)
Observations 117 119 117 117 119
R2 0.39 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.24
Table 6: Additional country regressions.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Variables are described in Appendix A.1 and are averaged over the period 1991-2010.
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A.4 Country analysis: alternative measures of inequality
Figure 9: Calibration results: 20/20 ratio.
Notes: The dashed line represents inequality (left axis) and the solid line growth (right axis) for different levels of public
education spending. The vertical line indicates actual data on public education spending, economic growth and inequality.
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Figure 10: Calibration results: Top 10% share of income.
Notes: The dashed line represents inequality (left axis) and the solid line growth (right axis) for different levels of public
education spending. The vertical line indicates actual data on public education spending, economic growth and inequality.
41
Figure 11: Calibration results: Top 20% share of income.
Notes: The dashed line represents inequality (left axis) and the solid line growth (right axis) for different levels of public
education spending. The vertical line indicates actual data on public education spending, economic growth and inequality.
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Figure 12: Calibration results: Gini.
Notes: The dashed line represents inequality (left axis) and the solid line growth (right axis) for different levels of public
education spending. The vertical line indicates actual data on public education spending, economic growth and inequality.
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